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Abstract: 
Despite the contentions about the effectiveness of decentralization as a form of 
governance and administration, there has been a rise in the number of countries attempting 
different forms of decentralization around the world in recent decades. By investigating what 
impact political decentralization had on service delivery in Kenya this paper seeks to contribute in 
gaining more understanding of decentralization and circumstances in which it is most effective. 
The study takes advantage of the border region between Tanzania and Kenya to perfume a 
natural experiment following the implementation of the county government framework of 
governance in 2013 through political decentralization in Kenya using difference-in-difference to 
examine if and what impact political decentralization had on service delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Political Decentralization and Service Delivery: A case study of the Southern 
border region of Kenya and the Northern border region of Tanzania. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Historical Underpinnings of the study: 
Kenya, like many other African countries, inherited a highly centralized system of 
governance in 1963 as she gained her independence. This was argued to be better for national 
unity and development as compared to a decentralized system (Kanyinga, 2016).  
However, in the successive years, political patronage, ethnic politics and regionalism 
resulted in underdevelopment brought about by unequal distribution of resources and public 
goods. Especially as a select political elite mainly from the majority ethnic groups became 
politically dominant while many of the regions occupied by minority ethnic groups lacked 
representation in elective posts and public service (Nyaura, 2018). Consequently, there was a rise 
in distrust and ethnic tensions as different groups strove to control the highly centralized 
executive powers. Over the decades this heightened ethnic resentment which initially displayed 
itself in minor post-election clashes like in 1992 and 1997, but eventually culminated into the 
2007/2008 post-election ethnic clashes in Kenya that almost saw the country descent into a civil 
war (Misati, 2011; Nyaura, 2018).  
In an effort to address the underlying issues that led to the ethnic clashes in 2007, 
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Kenyans held a referendum where they voted in favor of a new constitution whose core reform 
feature was decentralization (Mbate, 2017). This was largely due to the strong conviction that the 
only way to achieve political stability and equal development, if any, was through decentralization 
(Mbate, 2017). The new constitution brought a shift from the prior highly centralized governance 
framework to a decentralized one. These comprised two levels of governments that consisted of 
the national government and 47 county governments (Gimoi, 2017; Mwenda, 2010). Under this 
two-tier framework of governance both levels of government are considered equal in a 
consultative and coordinative relationship, because they are democratically elected with authority 
to raise revenue (Mbate, 2017; Mwenda, 2010). 
 In a radical shift from the prior framework where the national government had 
supervisory powers over local authorities through local governments, the new county 
governments enjoy political autonomy because they are not directly controlled by the national 
government. However, they are still subject to certain national policies as approved by the Senate. 
This change in intergovernmental relations was meant to allow county governments to fulfill one 
of its main functions which is guaranteeing the proper representation of the interests of voters at 
the county level(Mwenda, 2010). 
 Gimoi (2017), rightly points out that in article 174 of the new constitution1,the rationale 
behind decentralization is stated as enhancing self-governance and the promoting interests of 
                                          
1 http://sokodirectory.com/2016/11/kenyan-constitution-chapter-eleven-part-1-article-174-175/ 
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marginalized communities as well as their right to manage their own affairs thus, furthering 
development, easy access to public services and promoting national unity. Simply put, 
decentralization by bringing decision making power for resource allocation closer to the citizenry 
would result in more efficient allocation of public goods, at the local level and consequently 
promote development and as such enhance national unity. An argument that is supported by 
many proponents of decentralization (Joseph, 2014; Kanyinga, 2016; Litvack et al., 1998). In this 
study I, will use statistical analysis to examine whether the shift in governance from a framework 
where the national government had supervisory power over local authorities to one where 
subnational governments enjoy political autonomy, through political decentralization, did in fact, 
result in an improvement in provision or accessibility of public services. Taking advantage of the 
natural boundary at the Kenya-Tanzania border, which comprises of a region that shares 
similarities in geographical, social, economic, and previously centralized governance, this paper 
utilizes difference-in-difference method to examine the impact of political decentralization to the 
provision of service delivery, which in this specific case refers to the provision of piped water and 
electricity (Coast, 2002; Tiampati, 2015). 
The Statement of Problem and Relevance of the Study: 
According to the World Bank, by the year 2000, about 80 to 100 percent of the world’s 
countries had been estimated to have been experimenting with some form of decentralization 
(Faguet&Poschl,2015). This growing emergence of decentralization as a core part of the policy 
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reform agenda across the globe both in industrialized countries and in developing countries, and 
even more salient in African countries (Smoke, 2003) has led to the rise of a substantial body of 
literature on this subject (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2010; Menon, Mutero, & Macharia, 2008; Mk, 
2017; Nile, Central, September, & Bogere, 2013; Steiner, 2006). None the less, decentralization 
remains complex and indefinable and thus there is a need for more research in this field.  
It is also noteworthy that, the majority of the literature on decentralization focuses on 
administrative decentralization(Mwenda, 2010; Ssonko, 2015) and fiscal decentralization (Anosisye, 
2017; Arshad, 2010; Smoke & Whimp, 2011) while there is limited literature on political 
decentralization and its impact. 
Besides, Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, (1998) highlight the fact that the majority of the 
literature on decentralization is based on industrialized countries and thus there is a scarcity of 
literature on decentralization as it would apply to developing countries. He states that this may be 
because developing countries have different institutional frameworks. As such, he rightly argues 
that there is a lack of enough empirical knowledge that would allow scholars and practitioners to 
for instance make decisive recommendations on which type of decentralizations would be most 
appropriate for which types of service delivery in which type of institution. This paper seeks to 
contribute in the effort of filling this gap. 
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Hypotheses to be tested and Research Question: 
This paper hypothesizes that political decentralization, that is the creation of county 
governments with political autonomy from the central government in Kenya, had a positive impact 
on service delivery, that is, provision of piped water and electricity. The paper seeks to answer the 
question: “What is the impact of political decentralization on service delivery in the Southern 
border region of Kenya? “ 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review  
Defining Decentralization 
Defining decentralization remains a challenge especially because it takes many forms and 
has several dimensions. This has resulted in a variety of institutional restructuring being 
encompassed by this label (Litvack et al., 1998).  
There are three major dimensions of decentralization which include: political 
decentralization; institutional decentralization; and fiscal decentralization (Smoke, 2003). All the 
three dimensions are critical for achieving fully functional decentralization. According to Smoke 
(2003), a country has political decentralization when a subnational government, with suitable 
institutional instruments and capacity is equipped with clear and appropriate functions and 
resources and thus comprises a reduction of their accountability to the central government. 
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Second, in the case of institutional decentralization, the fundamental institutional architecture on 
which decentralization is based on involves the formal linkage of administrative bodies, systems 
and mechanism both local and intergovernmental. Lastly, fiscal decentralization involves the 
assignment of responsibilities and own-source revenue to subnational government. This paper 
focuses on political decentralization. It will analyses how political decentralization in Kenya, in this 
case the establishment of county governments with democratically elected governors and county 
assembly, impacted the provision of public services.    
Conceptualizing Political Decentralization: 
     This paper adopts Smoke (2003), and Spina (2013)’s definition of political decentralization  
as “an institutional reform that establishes additional subnational legislatures and executives”. 
Spina points out that political decentralization can take two different forms : one, when a group 
with distinct ethnic , linguistic and geographical characteristics is given additional  autonomy in 
the form of a legislative assembly as was the case with Scotland in 1999; and two, when a country 
sets up secondary level of political districts as was the situation in early ninety nineties in Croatia.  
 Kenya’s political decentralization embodies both forms as new levels of governments with 
an executive and legislative body were created across the country in regions that have distinct 
geographical characteristics and tend to be occupied by ethnic groups with distinct languages 
(Misati, 2011; Mwenda, 2010; Nyaura, 2018). 
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 Genuine political decentralization requires not only the creation of new levels of 
government, but importantly requires that these subnational levels of government possess 
meaningful decision-making autonomy (Brancati, 2006). Furthermore, there subnational 
governments should not experience any sort of intervention form the central government in terms 
of appointment, law-making or policy making(Spina, 2013). Fortunately, both conditions are 
demonstrated in Kenya’s case as county governments enjoy political autonomy(Mwenda, 2010).  
The Rationale for Decentralization: 
Existing literature reveals that not only are there many different rationales for 
decentralization, but, also that these rationales may not be relevant to each and every case 
(Litvack et al., 1998) . Nonetheless, the majority of proponents of decentralization argue that 
decentralization in most countries is as a result of the failure of centralized systems and as such 
has been critical for the very preservation of many national political systems (Litvack et al., 1998).  
Additionally, some scholars have argued that decentralization makes it possible  to attain 
allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods (Kanyinga, 
2016; Litvack et al., 1998; Misati, 2011). This is because it is assumed that as a result of 
decentralization,  decision-making  power is entrusted to those who have local information that 
distant bureaucrats are unable to access (Anosisye, 2017).  
Anosisye (2017), further notes that since decentralization enables electorates at the local 
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level to hold leaders accountable during elections, it can play a crucial role in fighting corruption. 
Additionally, she asserts that decentralization would stir competition as subnational governments 
in the face of incentives like grants and legitimacy are motivated to outdo each other 
consequently resulting in better service delivery. 
It is also argued that political decentralization can reduce ethnic conflict and secessionist 
sentiments through giving marginalized groups rights to self-governance, although this is still 
debatable (Brancati, 2006). 
On the other hand, there are assertions that decentralization is not good for 
development as it may never be fully realized since the implementation process is usually 
complicated by the need to negotiate the reforms against opposing political demands 
(Faguet,2015). This may be more so especially in the context of developing countries with weak 
institutions, so that it results in cynical decentralization where spending responsibilities may be 
devolved without decision making autonomy or vice versa (Faguet, 2015). This is because in these 
contexts central governments are more comfortable working with weak local governments that 
will not be opposed to directives and guidelines from them (Anosisye, 2017). 
Faguet (2015), additionally argues that decentralization reforms are largely driven by 
motivations of political survival and consolidation of power. Spina (2013), importantly articulates 
this by pointing out that although ideology and decentralization reforms may seem to be highly 
correlated, partisan support for reform is mainly based on calculated political gain. 
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As such it is noteworthy to point out that for African countries, the main catalysts for 
decentralization have been not only failure of centralized approaches to development, but also 
included external pressures from international organizations and to a significant extent a 
semblance of attempts by political leaders to expand their influence by the creation of 
restructuring of local institutions(Smoke, 2003). 
Nonetheless, in the Kenyan case, article 174, under chapter 11 of the 2010 Kenyan 
constitution bases the rationale for devolution on self-governance, economic development and 
equitable distribution of resources among others. That is, political decentralization by bringing the 
government closer to the people and allowing increased community involvement would increase 
local decision-making power for resource allocation and consequently improved service delivery 
(Gimoi, 2017). 
Decentralization and Service Delivery: 
 Right before Kenya’s devolution, Rugo (2013) in his  study on citizen participation and 
local public service delivery found out that there was minimal citizen participation in local 
governance and as a result this had insignificant influence on service delivery. He therefore rightly 
recommends that Kenya needed a system which rather than being directly linked to politicians, 
had a legal framework obliging local authorities to put into effect citizen’s proposals, one that he 
thought would be achievable under the devolution framework that was to be implemented in 
2013 (Rugo, 2013).Since then studies have shown that there has been an increase in public 
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participation in the county governance (Mbithi, Ndambuki, & Juma, 2019). This paper is premised 
on the argument that a politically decentralized county government system would promote public 
participation which enables local constituents to play a watchdog role(World Bank, n.d.) on the 
system in order to ensure efficient service delivery (Ekpo, 2008).  
    Thus when it comes to provision of public services, decentralized governments are in a 
better position to understand and attend to the tailored needs of local constituents as opposed 
to the far distance central government (Anosisye, 2017; World Bank, n.d.).  
Nonetheless, this paper also takes note of the challenges that face decentralization when 
it comes to effective service delivery which include but are not limited to: corruption ; weak 
institutions ; and lack of professional capacity of local leaders as has been experienced in Uganda 
and other southern African countries (Anosisye, 2017; Ekpo, 2008; Kannan, 2013; Litvack et al., 
1998; Smoke, 2003). 
Context of the Study:  
This study uses difference-in-difference as a natural experiment to examine a focused 
comparison of the Southern border region in Kenya and the Northern border region of Tanzania. 
It investigates whether the change in political and institutional structure of the government had 
any causal impact on the wellbeing of residents of the politically administrative at the border area 
0f the two respective regions.  
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Fig 1:1 Map showing the boundary between Kenya and Tanzania. Source United States. Department 
of State. Office of the Geographer2 
 As it can be seen in the map above, Tanzania and Kenya are neighboring 
countries sharing a border that divides the southern part of Kenya’s geopolitical territory and the 
northern part of Tanzania’s geopolitical territory. As neighboring states the two countries can have 
been readily used in compare and contrast studies, this is more so particularly for the Kenya-
Tanzania border region, as they share remarkable similarities including: similar climate; natural 
resource bases; growing populations of subsistence farmers, and similar cultural groupings most 
significantly the Maasai ethnic group as demonstrated by fig 1:2(Coast, 2002; Tiampati, 2015). The 
region also has similarities in terms of climatic conditions and socio-economic activities( Tiampati, 
2015) as it is shown in the figure 1:3 below; which shows the spatial pattern of biodiversity and 
protected pastoralists areas across both countries.  
                                          
2 https://www.loc.gov/resource/g8411f.ct003835/?r=-0.615,-0.061,2.23,0.842,0 
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Fig 1:2 Map of areas occupied by Maasai ethnic group 
across southern region of Kenya and northern region of Tanzania. Source BBC3  
Fig 1:3 Map showing biodiversity and protected 
pastoralist areas across Kenya and Tanzania. Notice the region around Kenya -Tanzania border have similar 
climate and biodiversity.4 
 Most relevant to this study is the similarities between their historical and colonial 
institutional legacies, with both countries being colonized by the British, although Tanzania was 
first colonized by Germany and only become a protectorate of the British government after  
World War 2(Miguel, 2011).  
It thus follows that since their independence in the early 1960’s Kenya and Tanzania 
                                          
3 https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22617001 
4 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/2041-7136-2-14 
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shared similar political administrative structures(Iii, 1997; Obosi et al., 2003). They both had 
centralized unitary governments, with Central national government and non-autonomous local 
government. They were both comprised of administrative regions headed by a regional 
administrator in Tanzania appointed by the president. In Kenya, these administrative regions which 
were then commonly referred to as provinces were administered by Provincial commissioners who 
were similarly appointed by the president. In both cases there existed was limited political 
autonomy(Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2012, 2018; Iii, 1997; Obosi et al., 2003).  
  
Fig 1:4 On the right Map of Kenya’s administrative regions (provinces) until 2013 before decentralization 
reform, on the left map of Tanzania’s administrative regions (regions). Source, nationsonline.org5 
However, in 2013 as has already been mentioned, Kenya underwent drastic and complete 
political and institutional decentralization, shifting from the prior highly centralized governance 
                                          
5 https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/tanzania-administrative-map.htm 
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framework to a decentralized one (Gimoi, 2017; Mwenda, 2010).It abolished the former regional 
and local government system and established county governments with county assemblies. The 
counties are headed by governors and have county assemblies whose members are directly 
democratically elected by the citizens, and are considered equal and independent from the central 
government( Mbate, 2017; Mwenda, 2010). Figure 1:5 below shows the new administrative 
structure, comprising of county governments in Kenya that were established after the 
promulgation of the 2010 constitution and came into force after the 2013 elections (Mwenda, 
2010). 
Fig 1:4 Official map of new Kenyan 
administrative regions with counties after 2013. Source Kenya Ministry of Lands.6 
                                          
6 http://lands.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Map-of-Kenya.pdf 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Specification and Estimation of the Model 
As mentioned in earlier sections, the main objective of this paper is an attempt at finding 
out what impact if any the devolution of the Kenyan government had on service delivery in Kenya. 
In order to achieve this the paper intends to apply Difference in Difference (diff-in-diff from here 
henceforth) method by taking advantage of the Kenya Tanzania border. The border separates the 
Southern border region of Kenya and the Northern border region of Tanzania. This provides us 
with inter-regional (albeit different countries) natural experiment and would as result allow us to 
compare the trends of service delivery across the two regions. 
        Based on diff-in-diff’s fundamental common trend assumption which deduces that in the 
absence of any intervention the trend in the control state is what should we should expect to 
observe in the treatment state( Angrist & Pischke,2015), this paper will presume that if 
decentralization had not been implemented in Kenya then, the trend of service delivery for the 
residents in Northern Tanzania border region during the period between 2008 to 2016 should be 
the same as the trend of service delivery for residents in the Southern border region of Kenya. 
 Therefore, any deviation from the trend would be assumed to be induced by a causal 
effect (Angrist & Psichke,2015). That is, any deviation from the trend in service delivery in the 
Southern border region of Kenya relative to the Northern region of Tanzania can be assumed to 
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be as a result of the causal effect of decentralization on the region’s residents’ service delivery.  
Moreover, this paper prefers to use diff-in-diff as it allows us to eliminate any existing 
pretreatment differences between the treatment and control group (Stock & Watsons, 2007). 
Although, Kenya and Tanzania are both developing countries that border each other, (citation) 
Kenya has a higher HDI (citation) and thus service delivery for residents in the Southern border 
region of Kenya may start out ahead of that of the residents in the Northern border region of 
Tanzania. Nonetheless, despite the pretreatment differences in the means, by generally focusing 
on the changes in the outcome over the duration of the experiment, the diff-in-diff estimator can 
eliminate the initial effects of the values of the outcome that cause systematic variation between 
the treatment and the control group (Stock & Watsons,2007). 
 Furthermore, diff-in-diff in the context of panel data, as in this study, will allow us to 
control for observed and non-observed omitted variables. This includes specifically, variables that 
may vary across the two regions but are constant over time and those that may vary over time 
but are constant across the two regions (Angrist & Psichke,2015).  
 As it is known, a simple diff-in-diff calculation involving only the four values comparing 
the differences of the changes of the pre and post situations of the differences of two regions 
would not give us estimates which will provide us with their statistical significance of the impact 
estimated. Therefore, this paper following  (Angrist & Psichke,2015)’s model prefers to use a diff-
in-diff regression specification with a dummy for the treatment region, Southern border region of 
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Kenya (treatment), a dummy for post treatment period (Post) and an interaction 
term(treatment*Post) dummy that will be a product of the treatment dummy and the post-
treatment period dummy. 
Servicedelivery st =β1 + β2 treatments + β3 Postt + β4 treatments*Postt + μst 
 The variable treatments controls for fixed differences between the two regions being 
compared, with treatments =1 in the case of Southern border region of Kenya and 0 otherwise. 
Postt acts a control for the fact that conditions change both for the control and treatment region 
during the study. Finally, the interaction term treatments*Postt, refers to the observations in the 
treated region in the post treatment period (Angrist & Pischke,2015). 
Measurements of the Variables: 
 The main outcome variable for this study is service delivery and it is measured using the 
following indicators; access to electricity and access to piped water. These indicators were selected 
based availability of data. 
The Data and Data Sources: 
This study uses nationally representative household-level panel data; the FinAccess 
Household survey data7 for Kenya and the Demographic and Health survey data8 for Tanzania. 
The data used included two pretreatment waves with data collected in 2009 and 2013 and one 
                                          
7 https://fsdkenya.org/finaccess/ 
8 https://dhsprogram.com/data/Getting-Started.cfm 
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posttreatment wave with data collected in 2015 as demonstrated by the diagram below. 
 
Diagram 1:1 Timeline of data collection pre and post enforcement of county governments in Kenya. 
The FinAccess Household survey data is a nationally representative household surveys 
held in intervals of three to four years and currently has five surveys carried out between 2006 
and 2015. Although it is focused on measuring impact of financial services, this paper chose to 
use it because it included socioeconomic variables that were useful for this paper7.  
 As mentioned above, for Tanzania, the paper used the Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS from here henceforth). The DHS is a well-known survey that has conducted more than 300 
surveys presently. This paper chose to utilize it as it covered a national scope, had household 
dataset, and had socio-economic variables relevant to this study8. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Impact of Decentralization on Provision of Electricity and Piped water 
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the characteristics of households and those of 
individual head of households that took part in the study for both the Kenyan region and the 
control region in Tanzania before decentralization and after decentralization was implemented. 
Panel A shows the mean and the standard deviation for the household characteristics of the 
households that took part during the pre-decentralization period in 2013. The total number of 
households that took part included 6,449 households. For the 2015 post-decentralization wave in 
Kenya 8,665 households participated and the summary statistics are reported in Panel B.  
 Panel C reports summary statistics for the households that participated during the 2013 
pre-decentralization wave, they were a total of 10,040 households. Lastly Panel D displays the 
summary statistics of the households in the Tanzanian region that were included during the 2015 
post-decentralization wave. They were 12,563 households. 
As shown in the table the mean for the number of households with access to piped 
water for our treatment variable Kenya in 2015 is 0.247 which is higher than that of 2013 0.229. 
Similarly, the mean for the number of households with electricity in Kenya in 2015 is 0.447 almost 
twice as much as that of 2013 which is 0.278. Therefore, in order to determine whether this 
difference is indeed statistically significant, this paper will use diff in diff regression to examine 
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whether political decentralization did result in an increase in access to electricity and piped water. 
 
 
Table 2 on page 22 reports the results of the impact of the implementation of county 
governance framework on provision of electricity and piped water to residents on the Kenyan side 
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of the border. The impact of decentralization is examined using the different pre and post 
decentralization periods to see if there is any significant difference in the post-treatment period.  
 As was mentioned previously in the methodology section, state fixed effects and year 
fixed effects have been applied to overcome any unobserved time-invariant and state-invariant 
characteristics. The study factors in controls for individual characteristics; and controls for 
household characteristics including size of the household, dummy variable for whether the 
household head has received any level of education or not, dummy variable for the gender of the 
household head, and household wealth index. The household wealth index consists of 5 dummies 
from the poorest to the wealthiest. The study additionally controls for regional characteristics 
using the urban dummy.  
Table 2 column (1) and (3) report the raw estimates without covariates with only regional 
controls. For Column (1) we see statistically significantly positive results for the impact of 
decentralization on provision of electricity two years after the establishment of county 
governments. The estimated interaction term implies that the establishment of county 
governments lead to a statistically significant 0.0984 percentage point increase in the provision of 
electricity to households on the Kenyan side of the border. 
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 Column (3) similarly reveal positive statistically significant results for the impact of 
decentralization on provision of piped water. The estimated interaction term indicates that the 
establishment of county governments lead to a statistically significant increase in supply of piped 
water to households on the Kenyan side of the border by 0.0647 percentage point. 
The outcome variables in column (2) and (4) report estimates including covariates. In 
these two columns we control for household characteristics including: education of head of 
household; gender of head of household; size of the household; and the household’s wealth index. 
We also control for urban dummy. The estimated interaction term for column (2), provision of 
electricity, is not only positive and statistically significant but larger than when we do not control 
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for household and community variables. The estimated interaction term for column (2) implies 
that the establishment of county governments resulted in statistically significant increase in the 
provision of electricity to households on the Kenyan side of the border by 0.147 percentage point.  
Column (4) reveals not only positive statistically significant results but an interaction term 
larger than when we have not controlled for household and community characteristics. The 
interaction term implies that decentralization resulted in a statistically significant increase in 
supply of piped water to households on the Kenyan side of the border by 0.113 percentage point. 
Robustness Check: 
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   In order to conduct a robustness check of the main analysis this paper used probit model 
displayed in table 3 on page 23. The findings were as can be seen in column 3 and column 4, 
surprisingly households in the urban areas, with a male individual as the head of the household 
were less likely to have access to electricity and piped water. Reasons for which could 
unfortunately not be provided in this paper. However, households where the head of the 
household were educated, as compared to those whose head were uneducated, were 51% more 
likely to have access to electricity and 29% more likely to have access to piped water.  
Nonetheless, households which were in the treatment region after decentralization were 44% 
more likely to have access to electricity and 35% more likely to have access to piped water.  
 
Falsification Test: 
Since the diff in diff logic is based on the assumption of common trend in that in the 
absence of treatment, in this case decentralization, the outcome between the access to electricity 
and piped water in the treated Kenyan region and the control Tanzania should not be different; a 
falsification test was performed to check if the trend is the same during the pre-treatment 
period(Angrist & Psichke,2015). Difference and difference regression was performed using 2 sets 
of data the first wave collected from the treatment and control region in 2008 and the second 
wave collected in 2013. Table 4 reports the results from the falsification test. The estimated 
interaction term in column 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant indicating that the trend observed 
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in table 2 is not the same in the pretreatment period. Hence, showing that decentralization did in 
fact result in a significant increase in access to electricity in the treatment region. However, the 
estimated interaction term in column 3 and 4 are statistically significant thus indicating that the 
trend in increasing access to piped water was similar even during the pretreatment period and 
thus decentralization did not lead to an increase in access to piped water.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion: 
Despite the increasing attempt at different forms of decentralization around the globe, its 
effectiveness as a system of governance and administration remains contentious. None the less, in 
the Kenyan case, our results reveal that political decentralization may not have resulted in the 
increased access in piped water but did result in improved service delivery in terms of provision of 
electricity to households in Kenya.  
These results support the idea that decentralization can promote service delivery, not 
only because local leaders are at a better position to understand the needs of the residents as 
opposed to far removed central government officials, but also since political decentralization 
allows citizens to hold local leaders accountable during elections. Hence, it can be implied that by 
providing residents with the ability to play a watchdog role on the government, which is now 
closer to the people, political decentralization pressurizes subnational governments to be more 
effective and even promote healthy competition among different subnational governments for 
better performance. 
We can also deduce from the positive results that political decentralization may be a 
solution for a multiethnic society where elite politicians from majority ethnic groups may 
marginalize regions occupied by minority groups by not providing them with necessary public 
services. Although, this paper due to limitation in time and data availability could not examine 
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whether the positive results where mainly due to the improvement in service delivery in regions 
that were initially historically marginalized regions, this study finds it plausible to assume that it 
may have been the case. 
Even so, this study is cautious in making this conclusion as these results are only 2 years 
after the implementation of county governments and cannot predict the trend in the long run.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions: 
As is the case for most studies on developing countries, this paper’s major challenge of 
limited data which limited the number of variables that could have been included to make it more 
conclusive.  
Future studies on the impact of county government on service delivery could be done 
over a longer period to see what the long-run effects would be. Additionally, they could 
investigate the question of what the impact of political decentralization was specifically for 
historically marginalized regions as compared to those that were not marginalized. It would be 
interesting to know whether decentralization promoted equal service delivery between wealthy 
counties and poor counties or instead widened the gap between them in terms of service delivery. 
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